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In this article, a simple  paper-and-pencil  experiment,  based on lottery bonds,  shows that 
financial  decisions  taken by participants are  inconsistent with the  traditional view of 
economic agents as risk averse expected utility maximizers. First, our results cast doubt on the 
relevance of variance as a measure of risk and put to light the importance of skewness in 
decision making. The decisions taken by participants are consistent with the optimal distortion 
of beliefs introduced in Brunnemeier and Parker (2005) and Brunnemeier et al. (2007). As a 
by-product of this study, we  also illustrate the fact that  people  use heuristics when they 
choose numbers at random and have, in general, a poor opinion about the rationality of others.  
 
JEL classification: D03, D81 





Lottery bonds are interesting assets to build an experimental study of investment choices and 
rationality for several reasons. First, these assets exist for more than two centuries in many 
countries and are, even today, very popular (Miller and Gentry, 1980, Lévy-Ullmann, 1896, 
Green and Rydqwist, 1997, Ridge and Young, 1998, Guillen and Tschoegl, 2002, Pfiffelmann 
and Roger, 2005). Second, contrary to the distribution of stock returns which is unknown, the 
distribution of lottery bond returns is perfectly known. Objective probabilities can be 
associated to the possible outcomes. Third, most people who never invested in lottery bonds 
easily understand how payoffs are defined because they bet, at least occasionally, on state 
lotteries like the lotto game. Fourth, some designs of payoffs introduce a pari-mutuel feature 
and people have to make assumptions about the rationality of others. 
For almost 60 years, economic rationality is a concept most often understood in the 
framework of expected utility (henceforth  EU) theory. Moreover, the utility function is 
assumed to be concave to take into account risk aversion. As soon as the word expectation is 
used, a probability space with states of nature, events, and at least a probability measure are 
referred to. Consequently, economic rationality also means that agents obey the rules of 
probability theory, especially the Bayes rule which states the way beliefs have to be changed 
when a new information is received (freely or costly)
1
To get a more tractable description of preferences, the “modern” theory of portfolio choice, 
starting with Markowitz (1952a), depicts investors as  agents taking  decisions in a mean-
variance world. The utility of an investment is then an increasing function of its expected 
return and a decreasing function of the corresponding variance. It is one of the most simple 
ways to describe risk aversion. But in another paper published the same year, Markowitz 
(1952b) himself challenges this simple view, dealing with a question  first  addressed by 
Friedman and Savage (1948). The two papers deal with the  puzzling fact that  many 
individuals simultaneously buy insurance contracts and (unfair) lottery tickets, a behavior 
. It then implicitly assumes that agents 
are able to manage all the information they receive, a maybe  complicated task  for 
professionals who receive a continuous information flow from all over the world. 
                                                  
1 Rationality and compliance to Bayes rule give rise to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) which means that 
prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available information (Fama, 1970).  
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inconsistent with risk aversion. The two papers refer to ranges of wealth where the utility 
function is convex to explain this kind of behavior.  
Twenty five years later, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory which 
describes the individual behavior by means of a S-shape value function (the equivalent of the 
utility function) and an inverse S-shape  probability weighting function. They base  their 
proposition on multiple experiments which show that people violate the axioms of utility 
theory on several aspects. First, they value risky prospects by considering gains and losses 
with respect to a reference point. Second, losses loom larger than gains. Third, agents are risk 
averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Finally, they distort 
probabilities, overweighting  small probabilities of extreme outcomes and underweighting 
moderate and large probabilities. The probability weighting function was then improved in 
cumulative prospect theory (henceforth CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), by borrowing 
the formulation of Quiggin (1982). It applies to the cumulative distribution of outcomes and 
no more to the probabilities of single outcomes   
Overweighting small probabilities of extreme events is an intuitive and convenient way to 
explain why people play unfair state-lotteries. These lotteries generally offer large gains with 
very small  probabilities.  They then attract investors obeying cumulative prospect theory. 
Another way to characterize these lotteries is to remark that they are highly positively skewed. 
For a long time, research  on  state-lottery  gambling  and  research in finance  have been 
separated. But recently, Barberis and Huang (2008), Bali et al.(2009) and  Kumar (2009) 
published papers focused on lottery-type stocks. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that stocks 
with positively skewed returns can be overpriced on markets populated by CPT investors. It is 
especially the case if the return on skewed securities is independent of the returns on other 
securities and if the supply of skewed stocks is small relative to the global market supply. 
Kumar (2009) shows the existence of significant  links  between investment behavior and 
lottery play behavior. He shows that investors used to play state-lotteries also prefer lottery-
like stocks. This observation is reinforced during economic downturns. Finally, Bali et al. 
(2009)  show that stocks exhibiting at least one very high return in the past month are 
overpriced. This effect is robust when controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. 
To explain these stylized facts, one more step was done by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) 
who introduced endogenous beliefs in the maximization of expected utility. Their basic idea is 
that distorting beliefs (in an optimistic way) generates more anticipatory utility but  comes at a 
cost. The future utility based on distorted beliefs is lowered because investment decisions 4 
 
taken under distorted beliefs are not optimal. They show that there exist optimal beliefs which 
equalize the marginal gain of changing probabilities and the cost of investing in a non optimal 
way. The intuition behind this result is that a slight distortion in beliefs generates first-order 
gains when the consecutive loss coming from non optimal investment is a second-order one. 
In a portfolio choice framework, it has several implications; investors become overconfident 
and optimistic. Moreover, they prefer positively skewed securities. Brunnermeier et al. (2007) 
pursue in the same direction and show in a finite state-space framework that investors 
overvalue the probability of one state and undervalue the probability of all other states. It 
leads to highly skewed optimal portfolios. Roughly speaking, the optimal portfolio is a 
combination of the risk-free asset and the most skewed asset available on the market. 
Less explicitly, most economic and financial models also assume that rationality of agents is 
common knowledge. Everybody is assumed  rational, everybody knows that everybody is 
rational, everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody is rational, and so on 
(Aumann, 1976). It is a strong assumption and many examples show that it does not represent 
the way people are thinking. The most famous example is probably the beauty contest (first 
introduced by J.M. Keynes, 1936, chapter 12, p. 156
2) which was translated by H. Moulin 
(1986) in numerical terms. Players have to choose a number between 0 and 100 and the 
winner is the one who chooses the number closest to a given percentage (say a) of the mean 
choice of players. The Nash equilibrium of the game is that everybody chooses 0 when a < 1
3
In this paper, we use two lottery bonds (specially designed for the study) to test  three 
assumptions. First, people are not choosing numbers at random even when they are expected 
. 
However, all experiments show that most people are far from choosing 0 (Thaler, 1998, 
Nagel, 1995). 
                                                  
2 As stated by John Maynard Keynes (1936): “Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may 
be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from 
a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the 
average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he 
himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom 
are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of 
one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We 
have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” 
3 Some guessing games involve negative feedback. Players have to find the closest number to 100 – p x mean. 




The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the two lottery bonds used in the 
experimental study. This section is written in such a way that the reader can think about 
possible answers and then can “participate” to the experiment. Section III proposes a 
theoretical analysis of the bonds and explains what theoretical choices should be, especially 
for a risk averse expected utility maximizer. Section IV presents the experimental results and 
section V concludes.  
. It means that they have common preferred numbers, a suboptimal feature in a pari 
mutuel game commonly observed in state lotteries (Farrell et al., 2000, Roger and Broihanne, 
2007). Second, when facing positively skewed distributions, investors do not behave like risk 
averse expected utility maximizers. In particular, they do not use a mean-variance criterion. 
Positive skewness is a highly weighted decision criterion and the probability of the highest 
possible outcome is overvalued. Finally, when the distribution of payoffs depends on the 
choices of others, people have a tendency to consider that others are not fully rational (and 
they seem right!). 
II Design of the lottery bonds 
Lottery bonds are in general fixed-rate bonds issued by a state or a firm where the fixed rate 
applies to the global issue. If a firm issues N one-year bonds, each with a face value of $1, it 
repays B = (1+r)N at the maturity date, where r denotes the interest rate. A part of this amount 
is redistributed to subscribers by means of a lottery. For example, B is divided in two parts 
such that: 
B = B1+B2 
n < N bonds are drawn at random and their holders share B1 (equally or not, depending on the 
design of the lottery). The remaining amount,  B2,  is then shared equally among the N 
subscribers or among the N – n losers.  
It is important to remind that, in most cases, the issuer bears no risk since it repays B whatever 
happens in the random draw. The risk is entirely borne by subscribers. Lottery bonds are then 
unusual financial assets because they should not exist in a world populated by risk averse 
expected utility maximizers with objective beliefs.  
In this section, we describe two kinds of lottery bonds which differ only by the way the 
amount paid by means of a lottery is defined. The structure of the two subsections is exactly 
                                                  
4 For example, Boland and Pawitan (1999) show that people have difficulties to choose numbers randomly, even 
in very simple tasks. 6 
 
the same and some of the sentences too, simply to make the reader think about the choices 
proposed at the end of each subsection (like in the following experiment). The theoretical 
analysis of the two bonds is reported in the following section. 
II-1 Lottery bond 1 
A bank, called Bank1, issues N units of a lottery bond (called bond1), each bond being sold 
$1. The subscriber of one bond has to choose a number between 1 and 10. At the maturity 
date, the bank pays an interest rate r on the global amount issued. However, the bank first 
draws one number at random between 1 and 10, say j (we say series j has been drawn). The 
issuer then pays $1 to each of the subscribers of series j and shares equally the remaining 
amount among all subscribers, including the winning ones. For example, table 1 shows the 
individual payoffs received by the subscribers, depending on the series they invested in and 
on the series which has been drawn. In this example, the number of bonds is 1 million and the 
interest rate paid by the bank is 5 %, so the bank will repay $1 050 000 at the maturity date. 
The first line (arbitrarily chosen) indicates the number of subscribers in each series and the 
first column identifies the possible states of nature (the series number drawn at random). 
There are then 10 states of nature. The following columns give the payoffs received by a 
subscriber of a given series in each state. For example, 1.95 is the final payoff obtained by a 
series-1 subscriber if 1 is drawn. As there are 100 000 subscribers in this series, each of them 
first receives $1 and the remaining $950 000 are shared equally among all the participants, so 
each subscriber receives $0.95. It explains the amounts appearing in the corresponding line. 
When number 2 is drawn, the series 1 subscriber receives $0.9 because there were 150 000 
subscribers in series 2 so the remaining amount is $900 000  shared by the 1 000 000 
subscribers. The same calculations justify the other amounts in the table. 
Table 1 around here 
 
The random payoffs can be formalized in the following way.   
Let  ()
i Xj  the payoff received by a series-i subscriber when the number j is drawn and denote 







=∑ where  k N is the number of series-k subscribers 
(first line of table 1). The issuer globally repays (1 ) rN +  but, according to the preceding rule, 
the individual payoff 
i X is defined by:  7 
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Denote ZN the random variable defined on the ten states of nature by:  






Ω = +− = 1  
We then have  { }
i
N i XZ = + 1 where  { } i 1 is the indicator function of state i  and  Ω 1   is the 
indicator function of the set of states of nature. This decomposition will be useful when we 
will study the moments of payoffs. 
Suppose that you have to choose a series to invest in. Obviously, if the  j N  are unknown, we 
can reasonably expect indifference between the 10 series which all generate an expected 
payoff (1 + r) because the  { } i 1 all have the same probability distribution.  
But what would be your choice if you were told the j N and if you were the last one-unit 
subscriber? For example, in table 1, would you choose series 8 with 50 000 subscribers or 
series 2 with 150 000? The detailed analysis is provided later on after the presentation of the 
second lottery bond. 
Lottery bond 2 
A bank, called Bank 2, issues N units of a lottery bond (called bond2), each bond being sold 
$1. The subscriber of one bond has to choose a number between 1 and 10. At the maturity 
date, the bank pays an interest rate r on the global amount issued. However, Bank 2 first 
draws a number at random between 1 and 10, say j, and shares equally 10% of the global 
initial investment among the subscribers of series j. The remaining amount is shared equally 
among all subscribers, including the winning ones.  
For example, table 2 shows the individual payoffs received by the subscribers, depending on 
the series they invested in and on the series which has been drawn. Table 2 is built as table 1, 
the number of subscribers in each series and the interest rate are the same. For example, 1.95 
is the final payoff obtained by a series-1 subscriber if series 1 is drawn. As there are 100 000 
subscribers in this series, each of them first receives $1 and the remaining $950 000 are 
shared equally among all the participants, so each subscriber receives $0.95. It explains the 
amounts appearing in the corresponding line. When a different number is drawn, the series 1 8 
 
subscriber receives $0.95 because the remaining amount is $950 000, shared among the 1 000 
000 subscribers. One essential difference between the two bonds is that the payoff received by 
a “losing-series” subscriber doesn’t depend on the number drawn for bond 2. In other words, 
each bond 2 pays only two different payoffs, a winning payoff or a losing payoff. 
Table 2 around here 
 
The random payoffs of bond 2 can, as before, be formalized in the following way.   
Let  ()
i Yj  the payoff received by a series-i subscriber when the number j is drawn and denote 







=∑ where  k N is the number of series-k subscribers 
(first line of table 1). The issuer globally repays (1 ) rN +  but, according to the preceding rule, 
the individual payoff 
i Y is defined  
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() 0.1
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If  Ω 1  denotes the constant random variable, 
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Suppose  you have to choose a series to invest in. If  the  number of subscribers j N   are 
unknown, we can reasonably expect indifference between the 10 series which all generate an 
expected payoff 1 + r. But what would be your choice if you were told the j N and if you are 
the last one-unit subscriber?  
III Theoretical analysis of the lottery bonds 
III-1 Lottery bond 1 
We remarked before that if the numbers  j N  are unknown, the potential subscribers should be 
indifferent between the series. What is changed when the information in table 1 becomes 
available? When I first  asked this question to colleagues and students during informal 
discussions, most of them answered that they would choose series 8 with the lowest number 
of subscribers. Their intuitive argument was that, after receiving $1 in the winning series, the 
remaining amount of money, shared among all participants, is higher when the number of 9 
 
subscribers is low in the winning series.  Only one colleague chose the highest frequency 
series, saying that the probability of being in a losing series is  much higher than the 
probability of  being in the winning series. I have to mention that they were not shown tables 
1 and 2 but only the number of bonds already sold in each series. 
It is time to analyze investment in bond 1 with usual investment criteria, especially by looking 
at the first moments of the distribution of returns.  
In the absence of information concerning frequencies, the expected return is 5 % for all series. 
The following proposition shows that it is the same if the distribution of frequencies is given. 
Proposition 1 
The expected payoff of bond 1 is independent of the subscribers’ choice and equal to 1+r 
Proof 
Denote 
i EXN    the expected payoff received by a subscriber of series i conditional on a 
given distribution of frequencies.  We have: 
{ }
1
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The first moment is independent of frequencies and is then not a criterion for a rational 
investor to decide. Consider now a mean-variance investor. We get the following proposition.
    
Proposition 2 
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   Proof: see the appendix 
Equation (3) shows that the variance of payoffs is lower in the series with the largest number 
of subscribers. In fact, if we note  1
i V XN +    the conditional variance of payoffs of series i 
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Proposition 2 shows that the variance of returns on series i is a decreasing function of  i N . It 
implies that the usual mean-variance investor would choose to “play with the crowd”, a not so 
intuitive result. However, if you imagine that all subscribers choose the same number, the 
issue becomes a risk-free asset paying 1 + r whatever is the number drawn by the bank. 
Proposition 3 
Denote 

























Using the same notation as before, let  1
i S XN +    the skewness of series i  payoff when there 
is one more subscriber in the series. We obtain:
  
1
ii S XN SXN +   =  
 
Proof: see the appendix 
Proposition 3 means that the skewness of the payoffs of series i remains the same when a new 
subscriber chooses series i. However, it doesn’t signify that the subscriber of one new unit is 
indifferent between series, simply because choosing a series changes the skewness of the 
other series!  
Figure 1 illustrates the non monotonic link between the skewness of payoffs and the number 
of subscribers with the data of tables 1 and 2. A mean-variance investor would choose the 
series with the highest number of subscribers but, so doing, he would not choose the highest 
positive skewness. 
Figure 1 around here 
 
Suppose  now  that the investor is risk averse and denote U  her utility function, assumed 
strictly increasing and strictly concave. The following proposition generalizes the preceding 
results and shows that this investor always chooses the most popular number, that is the one 
for which Ni is maximum. 
 
Proposition 4 11 
 
Let U  denote a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function.  If Ni  < Nj  then 
() ()
ij EUX EUX    <     
Proof: see the appendix 
The intuition behind proposition 4 is very simple when writing  { }
i
N i XZ = + 1 with  






Ω = +− = 1  
The investor prefers to add 1 to the lowest payoff of  N Z  simply because her marginal utility 
decreases with wealth. It is then optimal to add one unit of wealth on the worst state, that is 
the one for which  k N  is maximum. Proposition 4 indicates that risk averse expected utility 
maximizers should choose unambiguously n°2 if they face the distribution of frequencies of 
table 1. 
III-1 Lottery bond 2 
The financial analysis of bond 2 is much more simple. We saw in equation (2) that: 
{ }
0.9  if 
0.1
( ) (0.9 ) 0.1
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Losing series generate the same payoff  0.9+r but the payoff of the winning series is inversely 
proportional to the number of subscribers of this series. Being given a distribution of 
frequencies, the optimal choice of the last subscriber of the issue is always the series with the 
lowest number of subscribers because the corresponding payoff dominates the others in the 
sense of first order stochastic dominance. Bond 2 is also a good example to show  why 
variance is not always a good measure of risk. In fact, the expectation of series i payoffs is a 
decreasing function of  i N  but the variance of payoffs is also a decreasing function of  i N . In 
other words, no series is dominated in the mean-variance space. If we look more closely at 
two series i and j with frequencies  i N  and  j N  with  ij NN < . The payoffs are 0.9+r with 
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 more than series j with probability 0.1. It 
is as if you were given for free a lottery ticket paying this amount with probability 0.1. 
Whatever the preferences are (if they obey the first order stochastic dominance principle), it is 
reasonable to assume that you would accept the lottery ticket. 12 
 
We can remark that the moments of 
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It means that in the mean-variance space only, no bond dominates. This remark is an 
illustration of the lack of generality of the mean-variance criterion because first-order 
stochastic dominance leads to choose the highest variance. However, this remark has to be 
mitigated by the observation that the optimal choice is also the one with the highest Sharpe 
ratio. 
IV The experimental study 
IV-1 The questionnaire 
The experiment was realized during different finance courses at the University of Strasbourg. 
The students involved in the study come from four different training programs summarized in 
table 3. 
Table 3 around here 
The participants had to answer 6 questions divided into three groups of 2 questions related to 
the lottery bonds presented in the preceding section. In each pair of questions the first one is 
related to bond 1 and the second to bond 2. The  required answers were simply numbers 
between 1 and 10 corresponding to the choice of a series number.  
For the first two questions, participants were only told the characteristics of the bonds without 
any other information, either on the table of payoffs or on the choice of former subscribers. 
The features of the two bonds provided to the participants were only the repayment process by 
the bank. Remember that the only difference between the two bonds is the amount devoted to 
the winning series. For bond 1, this amount is random since it is equal to the number of 
subscribers choosing this series.  For bond 2, it is equal to  10 % of the global initial 
investment, that is $100 000. 
Obviously, with no information other than the way payoffs are defined, investors should be 
indifferent between the series and we expect a random choice for the two first questions. 
For the second group of two questions, we provided the distribution of choices of hypothetical 
former subscribers. The information given to respondents was the first line of tables 1 or 2 13 
 
and we specified that respondents were about to buy the last bond of the issue. In other words, 
each rational respondent was able to infer the final distribution of payoffs after his/her own 
choice  and to calculate figures appearing in tables 1 and 2.  Participants had to answer 
questions 1 and 2 before getting the information related to questions 3 and 4. 
Finally, in the third sequence of two questions, the rule was that participants had to choose a 
series number with the same information as in questions 3 and 4, but they were told that one 
million bonds were still to be sold to other subscribers after their own choice. Moreover, 
participants were also informed  that the following subscribers would know  the  current 
distribution of sales at the time of their own purchase. It means that the first line in tables 1 
and 2 would be updated after each transaction.  
IV-2 Results 
IV-2-1 Analysis of the complete sample 
The answers to the 6 questions are summarized in table 4. We deleted two questionnaires for 
which students have chosen the same number (neither 2 or 8) for the 6 questions, casting 
doubt on their motivation to participate in the experiment. Moreover, one student didn’t 
answer question 2. It explains why the total of column Q2 in table 2 is only 110 instead of 
111. 
For Q1 and Q2 where random choices were expected, we cumulated the corresponding 
frequencies in the last column of table 4 to test for a random distribution of answers. The 
theoretical frequency for a uniform distribution is 22.1 when cumulating Q1 and Q2. We 
observe that some numbers are preferred, especially numbers 1, 3 and 7. A χ
2 test rejects the 
uniform distribution assumption at the 1% level. It is not really surprising if we compare these 
results to the choices of French lotto players. In this game, players have to choose 5 numbers 
between 1 and 49 and (independently) a lucky number between 1 and 10. The sponsor of the 
game draws at random the winning combination and the lucky number. Since the start of the 
game in October 2008, number 7 has been drawn 8 times
5. For these particular draws, the 
proportion of winners of the lucky number was between 15.75% and 17.10% when 10% were 
expected if players choose their numbers at random
6
Table 4 around here 
. In our experiment, 16.3% of the 
participants choose number 7 in the first two questions. 
                                                  
5 For the 93 first draws up to 05/09/2009. 
6 The data on French lotto draws are provided on www.fdjeux.com and the percentage of lucky number winners 
is reported on www.sojah.com. 14 
 
The analysis of the preceding section shows that answers to questions 3 and 4 should be 
different if students decide according to the mean-variance model or, more generally, if they 
are risk averse expected utility maximizers. For question 4, they should choose number 8 
because it dominates the other choices according to first-order stochastic dominance. 82 
students out of 111 made this choice, that is 73.89%. A more “surprising” result is that 66 
students also selected the lowest frequency for question 3 and only 12 chose the highest 
frequency corresponding to the optimal mean-variance choice. It means that more than one-
half of the participants preferred the series with the highest variance. A part of the explanation 
may be found on figure 1. Choosing number 8 implies a preference for the highest skewness 
or, at least, for the highest outcome. Preference for positive skewness has been recognized in 
several papers (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976, Harvey and Siddique, 2000, Mitton and 
Vorkink, 2007, Bali et al., 2009). In particular, Bali et al. (2009) show that investors are 
willing to pay more for stocks that exhibit past extreme positive returns (in the preceding 
months). They observe that these stocks have lower returns in the future.  
A possible explanation to this choice is the overweighting of the probability of winning. As 
mentioned before, choosing number 8 leads to a greater gain if this series number is drawn by 
the bank because the remaining amount shared among all participants is higher. Obviously, it 
also generates greater losses if another number is drawn. The most frequent answer selected 
by respondents, namely n°8, also corresponds to the choice of agents obeying the theory of 
optimal beliefs developed in Brunnemeier and Parker (2005) and Brunnemeier et al. (2007). 
They consider an economy in which agents search for optimal beliefs, realizing a tradeoff 
between the immediate perceived gain of utility when beliefs are distorted, and the cost of a 
suboptimal investment. They show that the probability of only one state is biased upward, the 
other probabilities being biased downward. When the states are equally likely, the upward 
biased state is the one with the lowest price-probability ratio. In our context, it corresponds to 
the state with the highest payoff.     
Figure 2 illustrates this point. It represents the three-dimensional histogram of the pair (Q3-
Q4). The two horizontal axes correspond to the possible choices from 1 to 10 and the vertical 
axis gives the frequency of the 100 possible pairs of answers.  It appears that the area peaks at 
(8,8), corresponding to the lowest number of subscribers.  
The answers to questions 5 and 6 show results that may appear surprising at a first glance. In 
fact, we observe a dramatic decrease of answer n°8 associated to a large increase of answer 
n°2. Questions 5 and 6 introduce a kind of Keynesian beauty contest since respondents have 
to infer what next subscribers will choose. Moreover, participants  were told that their 15 
 
successors would have a complete and updated information about the subscription process. As 
we didn’t expect such a switching phenomenon, we didn’t formally introduce a question 
about the reason of switching. However, for three of the four groups of students we asked to 
switching students (in an informal discussion after the end of the experiment) the reasons of 
their choice. The answer was always the same. They were expecting that successors would 
choose answer n°8 (their own choice in Q3 and Q4) leading to an increase in the frequency of 
this answer and a decrease in perceived gains for themselves. This way of reasoning is not 
compatible with the assumption that rationality is common knowledge. To get more insights 
on this point, we restricted the analysis to the sample of participants whose answers obey 
first-order stochastic dominance, that is those who chose n°8 in question 4. 
IV-2-2 Analysis of the sample of “rational” participants 
The minimum requirement for a theoretical model of decision making under risk to be 
accepted by the scientific community is compliance to the first-order stochastic dominance 
rule. It is the reason why Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) was improved in 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The first version was not 
consistent with first-order stochastic dominance. 
In our study, the design of bond 2 was devoted to test the compliance to the first-order 
stochastic dominance principle. Question Q4 may be seen as a benchmark for this minimum 
requirement. In fact, answer n°8 dominates the others because the payoff of series 8 is greater 
if the winning series is n°8 and equal if another number is drawn. Consequently, we focus 
now our comments on the 82 “rational” participants who chose series n°8 in Q4. The results 
for this subsample are given in table 5.  
Table 5 around here 
The first remark is that answers to questions 1 and 2 are not random and the bias in favor of 
n°7 remains present; it is even reinforced. The second observation is that the answer to Q3 is 
still concentrated on n°8 but those who don’t choose this number are dispersed among the 
nine other numbers. The most interesting observation on this table is the change between Q3-
Q4 and Q5-Q6. We observe that a large proportion of these “rational” players switches to 
other answers and especially to n°2. Concerning Q6, if participants were thinking that other 
subscribers are rational they should be indifferent between all solutions for which the number 
of subscribers is lower than 200 000. To explain why it is the case, assume that all investors 
are rational and rationality is common knowledge. As the number of bonds of the  issue is 16 
 
now 2 millions, the subscription should end with 200 000 bonds in each series. The reason is 
simple. It is suboptimal to choose a series with more than 200 000 bonds already purchased 
because such a situation implies that there is at least another series with a lower number of 
subscribers and hence dominating payoffs.  
However, if you assume that other subscribers are not completely rational and have a “one-
step” reasoning, it appears optimal to play with the crowd, expecting that the others will 
choose the low frequency series. This switching behavior of the “rational” subsample also 
shows that participants have difficulties to integrate the information related to the future 
updating of information for the next subscribers. In fact, if a large number of players chooses 
series 2, it will obviously become a high frequency series and future subscribers will change 
their choices. Then, even with individuals that only obey the first-order stochastic dominance 
rule, the choice process should lead to equal frequencies in the end. 
V Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the way people manage a simple financial decision making 
problem based on lottery bonds. These assets are interesting for such an experiment because 
they are popular on markets where they are traded and their features are close to the ones of 
state-lotteries. The abovementioned literature has shown that investors may be ready to pay a 
high price for positively skewed securities.  In our experiment, all possible choices were 
skewed securities and in this framework we observed that a large part of respondents was 
choosing the highest skewness, even when it was associated to the largest variance. But the 
highest skewness also corresponds to the security with the highest return in the winning state. 
This result is then consistent with the theoretical analysis of Brunnemeier et al. (2007) and 
with the empirical study of Bali et al. (2009).  
We also showed that people use heuristics to choose numbers at random, leading in fact to 
non random choices at the aggregate level.  The number 7 is especially popular among 
respondents and it comes with no surprise. For example, Roger and Broihanne (2007) already 
showed that this number is the most popular among the 49 numbers of the French lotto game. 
Finally, by introducing a kind of beauty contest in the experiment, we observed that 
respondents don’t assume that rationality is common knowledge, either because they 
recognize their own limited rationality or because they consider that other are not fully 
rational.  17 
 
The limitations of this paper lie essentially in the small sample considered here. 111 
respondents are probably insufficient to get definitive results and this study has to be extended 
to larger samples in different contexts, not limited to a population of students but extended to 
different categories of investors. However, it may be easily replicated and we hope it will be. 18 
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Proof of proposition 2 
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Proof of proposition 3 
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It is easily seen that if N becomes N+1 and  i N  becomes  1 i N + the skewness doesn’t change. 
Proof of proposition 4 
{ }
i
N i XZ = + 1  
Assume without loss of generality that the values of  N Z   are ranked in increasing order, 
corresponding to a ranking of the  i N   in decreasing order.  We know that  ()
i Xi   is the 
maximum possible value of 
i X . It means that selecting a number  when buying a bond 
transfers the i-th outcome of  N Z  at the right tail of the probability distribution (winning 
always generates a better outcome than losing!).  It implies that transferring the lowest 21 
 
outcome to the right tail by a given amount is always preferred by a risk averse agent because 
the marginal utility is decreasing when the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly 
concave. But as the lowest value of   N Z  corresponds to the highest value of  i N , we get that a 
risk averse investor always prefer to bet with the crowd. 
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Table 1: Payoffs of bond 1 
The “seriesK” column contains the payoffs received at the maturity date by a subscriber of series K when the 
number drawn at random is the one appearing in the first column and the same line. 
Series1 Series2 Series3 Series4 Series5 Series6 Series7 Series8 Series9 Series10
100000 150000 80000 120000 60000 140000 70000 50000 130000 100000
1 1,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95
2 0,9 1,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9
3 0,97 0,97 1,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97
4 0,93 0,93 0,93 1,93 0,93 0,93 0,93 0,93 0,93 0,93
5 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 1,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99
6 0,91 0,91 0,91 0,91 0,91 1,91 0,91 0,91 0,91 0,91
7 0,98 0,98 0,98 0,98 0,98 0,98 1,98 0,98 0,98 0,98
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
9 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,92 1,92 0,92
10 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,9523 
 
Table 2: Payoffs of bond 2 
The “seriesK” column contains the payoffs received at the maturity date by a subscriber of series K when the 
number drawn at random is the one appearing in the first column and the same line. 
Series1 Series2 Series3 Series4 Series5 Series6 Series7 Series8 Series9 Series10
100000 150000 80000 120000 60000 140000 70000 50000 130000 100000
1 1,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95
2 0,95 1,62 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95
3 0,95 0,95 2,20 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95
4 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,78 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95
5 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 2,62 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95
6 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,66 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95
7 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 2,38 0,95 0,95 0,95
8 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 2,95 0,95 0,95
9 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,72 0,95
10 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,9524 
 
Table 3: Origin of participants 
Program Number of students
EM Strasbourg Business School 40
Master in Finance (second year) 20
Master in Actuarial Studies 20
Master in Finance (first year) 33
TOTAL 11325 
 
Table 4: Results of the experiment: complete sample 
Column 1 gives the series number. Column 2 provides the information about the choices of former subscribers 
(relevant for questions 3 to 6). Columns 3 to 8 report the numbers of students choosing the corresponding series 




Table 5: Results of the experiment: “rational” sample 
This table gives the results of the subsample of respondents having chosen n°8 to question 4. Column 1 gives the 
series number. Column 2 provides the information about the choices of former subscribers (relevant for 
questions 3 to 6). Columns 3 to 8 report the numbers of students choosing the corresponding series number in the 
first column. The last column adds the frequencies of questions 1 and 2 where random choices are expected. 
SERIES NUMBER BONDS BOUGHT Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q1+Q2
1 100000 12 8 4 0 7 1 20
2 150000 11 10 7 0 26 29 21
3 80000 11 8 3 0 8 7 19
4 120000 6 5 1 0 3 2 11
5 60000 8 10 3 0 4 1 18
6 140000 3 3 4 0 4 6 6
7 70000 13 17 3 0 7 8 30
8 50000 5 7 56 82 16 19 12
9 130000 5 3 0 0 3 3 8
10 100000 8 11 1 0 4 6 1927 
 
 
Figure 1: Skewness of payoffs of bond 1 as a function of the number of subscribers (data 




Figure 2: 3-dimensional histogram of answers to questions 3 and 4 
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